Solving the executive pay problem

The idea that executive pay can be "too high" is a touchy issue. While many regular Joes are seeing their jobs disappear, or have been forced to endure cut backs to salary and benefits, CEO pay continues to escalate. Bonuses in the financial sector - never popular among the general public - are largely back to their stratospheric pre-crisis levels, much to the chagrin of the tax payers who funded the bailouts that kept them in business. And there is the growing chasm between those at the top and the bottom of the pay ladder that helped galvanize the Occupy movement. According to one recent study, the gap between CEO and average U.S. worker pay was 325-to-1 in 2010. In 1965, it was 24:1.

The business community, of course, continues to argue that it should have the right to determine its own remuneration levels. The global market for executives, they say, forces them to offer high salaries to attract the top talent. But stagnant performance is prompting many to question the logic of that argument. Why should companies be rewarding top executives for failure when everyone else is tightening belts?

Unsurprisingly, regulators have started talking tough. But progress has been limited. Three years ago President Obama announced that he would cap the salaries of executives of companies in receipt of TARP balilouts, yet by 2010 could do nothing to stop those companies awarding huge bonuses, judged to be "ill advised" by his newly appointed pay czar. A more systematic approach was promised with the Dodd Frank financial regulation, but efforts to rein in pay have had limited success. After much sword rattling from senior British politicians, the announcement by the UK government on January 23rd of a new approach to regulating executive pay claims to be the start of a more concerted response to the problem. The trouble is, it is not a very convincing solution. And perhaps even worse, it is not at all clear what the problem really is that they are trying to solve.

The "problem" with executive pay is that it is in fact a whole set of related problems. And each of these require different types of solutions. Income disparity between high and low earners is one thing, whereas CEOs being rewarded for poor performance is quite another. Setting the pay of bailed out businesses is yet another. And so on.

Regulators have to work out which of these problems they are trying to solve and what the best combination of regulation, encouragement, incentives, and sanctions should be to achieve desired results. Take the problem of pay disparity and those troubling pay ratios.  Blunt regulation probably isn't going to be very helpful here. For a start no one really knows what the "right" ratio should be. A maximum permitted ratio of say 100:1 may be feasible in some industries, less so in others. And as many have pointed out, the unintended effects might be that companies start outsourcing any of the low wage jobs they still have to generate a lower ratio.

Incentives, such as tax breaks for companies reaching certain thresholds, may offer more potential, although it would be technically complicated to administer effectively. A pay-ratio credits type market could also be devised whereby those companies failing to meet their targeted ratio could buy credits from those that over-achieve theirs. Much like in carbon markets, these types of systems help to even out differences across industries.

The "transparency" option trumpeted by the current UK government speaks to a more typical way of government providing the framework for corporate social responsibility initiatives. In creating a mechanism for pay ratios to be compared across companies (such as through mandatory reporting of pay, and support for some type of league tables comparing performance) governments can spur companies to improve their ranking. This avoids any necessity of setting limits or levels of acceptable performance and instead relies on competitive forces to drive improvements. As with all these incentives type approaches, it remains up to companies themselves to determine how to improve their performance, whether through increasing the remuneration of lower paid workers or decreasing that of higher paid executives. It stops regulators getting directly involved in setting pay limits and enables businesses the freedom to determine what works best for them from a competitive point of view.

Of course, there are also other less direct ways to encourage better pay equity. George Monbiot the UK journalist and environmental campaigner has recently put forward a spirited defense of a "maximum wage". Others argue for incentives or regulations to encourage increased employee share ownership among the lower paid. Such initiatives avoid the risk of companies simply "gaming" the pay ratio statistics, but also run into other problems, such as resistance from the business community and difficulties in implementation. Still, there is plenty of scope for interesting and imaginative ideas to help solve this and the other executive pay problems, and the UK in particular seems to be at a crucial tipping point in terms of public support for change.

Where the current UK government's proposals largely fall flat is in their over-emphasis on enhancing shareholder control of executive pay. For a start this does nothing directly about pay equity (which is what the public wants) but rather focuses more on the problem of whether senior executives are being rewarded for poor performance. Whilst giving shareholders more input into executive pay is not a bad thing, first you need to have shareholders that are active participants in the companies they invest in. In our dispersed ownership model of financial capitalism where shares are often held for matters of minutes, hours, and days rather than months and years, we often simply don't have sufficient shareholder engagement for such initiatives to make all that much difference. Similar rules imposed by the Dodd Frank Act in the US have done little to curb executive pay.

Clearly the time is right for action on the manifold problems of executive pay. But for those seeking to tackle them, whether in industry, government, academia, or civil society, it is imperative that there is clarity on which problems are going to be addressed. And dealing with such complex issues is going to require more creativity in terms of solutions, and more joined-up-thinking in terms of the causes of those problems, than we've generally seen so far.

Photo by GDS Infographics. Reproduced under Creative Commons Licence

Is too much transparency a bad thing?

It’s been quite a week or so for transparency. The incendiary WikiLeaks release of almost a quarter of a million classified cables from the US diplomatic service has set news media across the world alight with daily revelations that have acutely embarrassed politicians everywhere. Last week also saw the FIFA bribery scandal reach new heights with the screening of the BBC Panorama program alleging corruption, followed by last Thursday’s selection of Russia and Qatar as the hosts of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups respectively. Yes, that’s Russia, the country labeled a “virtual mafia state” in one of the WikiLeaks cables. Both cases involve a whole host of ethical issues, but perhaps more than anything they pose critical questions about the appropriate limits of transparency. How much should we know about what goes on behind the scenes in organizations such as the US diplomatic service or a global sporting body such as FIFA? And can too much transparency really be a bad thing?

WikiLeaks is clearly the most significant case of the two, and it looks set to be something of a landmark on the ethics of transparency in the digital age. On the one side, high profile rightwingers in the US, including Presidential hopeful Mike Huckerbee, have responded by suggesting the source of the leaks should be tried for treason. “Anything less than execution is too kind a penalty,” he commented. WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange is under investigation in the US and Australia, wanted for questioning in Sweden (for an unrelated charge), and on Interpol’s red list – not to mention being cast by Sarah Palin as an “anti-American operative” who should be pursued with “the same urgency [as] al Qaeda and Taliban leaders”. Bradley Manning the army private who is supposedly the original source of the material is sitting in a military jail awaiting court marshal and a possible 52 years in jail. US internet companies Amazon, Paypal and EveryDNS, meanwhile, have responded to pressure by US authorities and ceased supporting WikiLeaks by allow it to use their servers, domains, and payment services respectively. As a result, the organization has been forced offline several times in the last week.

On the other side of the debate, five respected news organizations – the New York Times, The Guardian, Le Monde, El País, and Der Spiegel – received prior access to the cables and have shown little hesitation in splashing front page stories over the past 10 days. Various commentators, hackers, and net activists have heralded the leaks as a new phase in the radical transparency of digital information. Columbia, meanwhile, has offered Assange immunity, whilst Amazon has been touted as a boycott target for caving to “censorship” and political restrictions on “free speech”. Clearly, things are complicated, to say the least.

The publishing of the embassy cables by WikiLeaks is in many ways a more ethically ambiguous act than many of their previous leaks, most notably the well known Iraq and Afghanistan war logs which detailed the hidden impacts of US military action. Other WikiLeaks though have also won acclaim focusing on documents alleging political and corporate corruption, public interest media reports suppressed by injunction, and secret Congressional research reports. The embassy cables, just by their sheer volume, represent a less focused campaign.

Yes, there are clearly some important public interest revelations in the material that has come to light. These include: the exposure of a US spying campaign targeted at UN leaders; the naming by US diplomats of China’s propaganda chief Li Changchun as the orchestrator of the Google hacking late last year; and disclosures that the Brazilian government deliberately covered up the existence of terrorist suspects within its borders to protect the country’s image, to name just a few. Oh and of course claims that the media organization al-Jazeera is heavily influenced by state foreign policy in Quatar, where the 2022 World Cup is going to be held. But it has to be said that many of the big news stories are no more than allegations by diplomats in what they thought were confidential dispatches rather than necessarily well-founded or verified facts. There is also a whole lot more material that is just plain gossip and rumor-mongering rather than what you might genuinely call ‘intelligence’.

All this makes the WikiLeaks cables less clear cut in terms of making the hidden “truth” public. They provide us with a unique insight into how international diplomacy works, and what emerges is hardly pretty or a paragon of honesty and integrity. But it is hardly the case of a whistleblower bringing a miscarriage of justice to light or an exposé of corporate malfeasance or political corruption, except in the very broadest of terms. Sure the material in the leaks is incredibly interesting, but how we have to ask how much of it is genuinely in the public interest. If it doesn’t pass this test, then why should supposedly classified information become public?

On the other hand, the arguments emanating from the US that the release of the cables has injured the national interest and put lives at risk is also rather flimsy. Yes it has embarrassed the government, but then who hasn’t it embarrassed? Putin, Burlosconi, and others have been just as much the target as those in the US. And no one yet has managed to unearth anything that has genuinely put lives at risk even if it has probably hampered US diplomatic efforts in general. This of course begs the question of why so much information should be classified in the first place if it’s not actually protecting anything.

It is this – the transparency versus confidentiality issue – that is at stake here. Some would clearly like to see all but the most critical security information made public so that the state can be held to account. Others believe that a communication made under the presumption of confidentiality should remain that way unless there is a clear public interest reason for disclosing it. In the FIFA case, there seems little doubt that the BBC was right to go public with its allegations of corruption, even if some commentators were unhappy that it potentially hampered England’s bid to host the 2018 tournament. And even if FIFA President Sepp Blatter complained of “the evils of the media"

The WikiLeaks cables though are so indiscriminate as to fail the public interest test, at least when considered as a whole. However, with appropriate sorting and contextualizing (which the newspapers appear to be doing a pretty good job of), this changes the complexion somewhat. Newspapers like the New York Times and The Guardian have given a good account of their motives and methods. As the New York Times editor says:

"The more important reason to publish these articles is that the cables tell the unvarnished story of how the government makes its biggest decisions, the decisions that cost the country most heavily in lives and money. They shed light on the motivations — and, in some cases, duplicity — of allies on the receiving end of American courtship and foreign aid. They illuminate the diplomacy surrounding two current wars and several countries, like Pakistan and Yemen, where American military involvement is growing. As daunting as it is to publish such material over official objections, it would be presumptuous to conclude that Americans have no right to know what is being done in their name."

With appropriate journalistic selecting and framing, there is little doubt that there is an important if rather delicate media task at work here. This doesn’t condone the release of the cables en masse, though, which in our opinion is harder to defend from an ethical point of view, unless one’s view is that all government should be 100% transparent.

Regardless of the rights and wrongs of WikiLeaks in this particular case, though, the broader lesson seems to be fairly clear. In business ethics, one of the standard rules of thumb is the New York Times test – if you wouldn’t want your actions to be reported on the front page of the newspaper then maybe you shouldn’t be doing it. No doubt US diplomats didn’t expect this to so literally come true, but in a digital world, the prospects for doing so are increasing exponentially. And if you don’t want to be a news star, then you’ll need to work a lot harder than the US government in making sure what is said in confidence stays that way.



WikiLeaks graphic by Anna Lena Schiller reproduced under Creative Commons Licence
America Shhh image reproduced from Boycott Amazon for Dumping Wikileaks